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The value of cash holdings
Overinvestment
Investor protectionThis paper investigates the inﬂuence of the economic value added (EVA) per-
formance evaluation, issued in 2010 by the State-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission of the State Council, on the value of the cash
holdings of central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs). We ﬁnd that EVA per-
formance evaluation has some inﬂuence on the overinvestment of CSOE cash
holdings and signiﬁcantly increases the value of CSOE cash holdings compared
with the cash holdings of local state-owned enterprises. The greater value of
CSOE cash holdings derives from underinvestment modiﬁcation and overin-
vestment restraint. The value of cash holdings increases more for companies
with better accounting performance. Thus, the EVA performance evaluation
policy increases CSOE eﬃciency. This study contributes to the emerging lit-
erature related to cash holdings and the economic consequences of the EVA
performance evaluation policy. It expands the literature related to investor
protection in countries experiencing economic transition.
 2015 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by B.V. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Jensen and Meckling (1976) ﬁnd that managers routinely waste their ﬁrm’s cash for personal beneﬁt.
Furthermore, Jensen (1986) observes that managers hold on to excess cash for personal beneﬁt. These argu-
ments have been widely cited in the domestic and overseas literature. Due to the separation of ownership and
control, managers often consume corporate cash to maximize their own beneﬁts or act in a way that fails to
maximize the beneﬁts of stockholders. The agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership and
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shareholders. The consumption of cash is likely to be an important component of agency costs.
Cash is very important to the management and operation of a corporation. Cash holdings provide money
to meet the daily needs of a corporation and decrease ﬁnancial risk. In addition, a ﬁrm’s value rises when its
cash is invested. Compared with other kinds of assets, cash is a form of proﬁt and can be easily transformed
into a personal beneﬁt at a lower cost (Myers and Rajan, 1998). Given the separation of ownership and con-
trol, inside managers can aﬀect the decisions made in relation to cash holdings via residual control. They hold
more cash and accept projects that are harmful to shareholder interests, which decreases the value of the cash
holdings and decreases their ﬁrm’s market value to a point lower than book value (Jensen, 1986).
There are two factors that aﬀect the value of cash holdings. The ﬁrst is ﬁnancial characteristics, including
ﬁnancing constraints, growth opportunities and investment opportunities. A ﬁrm’s level of cash holdings
aﬀects its market value, which increases as cash holdings rise. The connection becomes stronger if a ﬁrm faces
better growth opportunities (Saddour, 2006). In theory, a shareholder believes that $1 of a ﬁrm’s cash holdings
is equivalent to its book value. However, for a ﬁrm with better investment opportunities, a premium exists in
its cash holdings (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007). The second factor is corporate governance. The eﬀective-
ness of a ﬁrm’s corporate governance reﬂects the market value of its cash holdings, which in turn inﬂuence the
ﬁrm’s value. Firms with good corporate governance enjoy twice the cash market value of ﬁrms with poor cor-
porate governance. The negative eﬀect on operating performance resulting from holding large amounts of cash
is suppressed in ﬁrms with good corporate governance (Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Dittmar and Jan, 2007).
Agency problems are common and agency costs decrease the value of cash holdings. Therefore, managers
who restrain their self-interest may signiﬁcantly increase the value of their ﬁrm’s cash holdings. When dis-
cussing how manager’s performance evaluations inﬂuence the value of their ﬁrm’s cash holdings, it should
be made clear that appropriate evaluation is the premise for encouraging managers to increase the service eﬃ-
ciency of their funds. Choosing a core performance evaluation index is the key point in a manager perfor-
mance evaluation system. When a manager’s income is positively related to the performance of his or her
ﬁrm, economic value added (EVA) can operate as a performance evaluation index that encourages managers
to make eﬃcient investment decisions that raise the value of their ﬁrms (Rogerson, 1997). In addition, when
EVA is included in a manager’s compensation incentives, that manager will cut down ﬁnancing decisions out
of self-interest, which has little eﬀect on any increase in ﬁrm value (Stern and Stewart, 2004). This paper con-
siders whether an eﬀective manager performance evaluation system decreases agency costs and improves the
value of a ﬁrm’s cash holdings.
Given China’s unique institutional background, central SOEs (CSOEs) play an important role in economic
growth and the development of a healthy securities market. Although CSOEs have undergone many reforms,
many problems remain unsolved. For a long time, CSOEs failed to focus on their main businesses, electing
instead to pursue large-scale projects and lowering the eﬃciency of their funds as a result. To correct this
development pattern and protect small investors, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC) of the State Council issued its Interim Measures for Business Performance Appraisals
of Persons-in-Charge at Central Enterprises in 2010. Since then, the performance of CSOE heads has been
evaluated based on the EVA index.
The main change in this regulation was the use of EVA. EVA comprises 40% of the core index of return of
assets. The key point in manager performance evaluations therefore changed from proﬁt to value, forcing
CSOEs to focus on value management rather than strategic management. In addition to total proﬁts, capital
eﬃciency is an important factor inﬂuencing EVA. In short, EVA value, which represents the value of a ﬁrm,
grows as the ﬁrm’s capital eﬃciency improves. The wise management of capital, achieved by decreasing the
cost of occupied capital and improving the eﬃciency of used capital, is an important approach to improving
ﬁrm value. Meanwhile, as mentioned in the Notice on accomplishing the ﬁnancial budget management and
preparation of statement work at central enterprises in 2013, CSOEs are required to stick to the rule that cash
is king in budget management, highlighting the importance of capital management. This regulation asks
CSOEs to put cash management ﬁrst, detail their capital budgets and arrange their ﬁnancial resources eﬃ-
ciently. In a macro-policy setting, we research cash holdings in CSOEs from an EVA perspective of value cre-
ation. The relationship between EVA and cash holdings in CSOEs is readily apparent. Furthermore, it would
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cash holdings in CSOEs.
The literature related to the value of cash holdings has focused mainly on ﬁnancial characteristics, corpo-
rate governance and ﬁnancial constraints. These aspects are representative of a ﬁrm’s internal or external envi-
ronment. Exploring the factors that inﬂuence the value of cash holdings from internal or external environment
perspectives reveals their systematic nature and comparability. The sample in this study consists of listed com-
panies that are controlled by CSOEs and matched with local SOEs (LSOEs). The SASAC chose EVA as its
index to evaluate the performance of the heads of CSOEs. Combining our sample with this policy context, we
research the inﬂuence of EVA on the value of CSOE cash holdings. We also try to reveal the intention behind
the policy and determine whether it works according to the information we acquire.
This paper makes the following contributions. First, in terms of the EVA evaluation index, whether the
heads of CSOEs change their previous management theory to create ﬁrm value remains unknown. Because
cash has the highest liquidity in a ﬁrm, this paper pays attention to factors that aﬀect cash value. It helps
to clarify the connection between EVA and the value of cash holdings and provides a theoretical basis and
tests for the eﬀect of the policy.
Second, this paper tests the economic consequences of EVA evaluation carried out in CSOEs from a cash
holdings perspective. It enriches the literature related to the value of cash holdings while connecting it with the
EVA literature.
Third, this paper can be broadly classiﬁed as a study of corporate governance and the value of cash hold-
ings. It analyzes how the EVA evaluation index inﬂuences the value of cash holdings in detail and therefore
extends the literature in that ﬁeld.
The following features may enhance the validity of our research beyond the contributions just mentioned.
First, ﬁrms in China can be divided into several classes according to administrative level, such as enterprises of
the central government, enterprises of provinces or ministries, enterprises of prefectures or departments and
enterprises of counties or divisions. The higher the administrative level of a ﬁrm, the stronger its inﬂuence on
the Chinese macro-economy. CSOEs are crucial participants and their operating eﬃciency plays an important
role in this macro-economy. Second, investors in the Chinese stock market are widely considered to be poorly
protected. According to the EVA evaluation index, corporate governance can ensure better investor protec-
tion. It not only improves the level of investor protection in the Chinese market, but also provides an empirical
reference for other emerging markets.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 contains the literature review. Section 3 reveals the
institutional background, theoretical analysis and research hypotheses. Section 4 presents the research design,
including the sample selection, model design and variable deﬁnitions. Section 5 describes the descriptive statis-
tics. Section 6 reports the empirical test results. Section 7 oﬀers a conclusion and presents the limitations of the
paper.
2. Literature review
This paper focuses on cash, the value of cash holdings and EVA performance evaluation. In this section, we
review the literature related to cash holdings and EVA performance evaluation.
2.1. Cash holdings and the value of holdings
Studies of cash holdings and their value have an important position in corporate ﬁnance. The scale of cash
holdings and eﬃciency of cash use play important roles in a ﬁrm’s value because cash is a ﬁrm’s most essential
liquid asset. Bates et al. (2009) classify the reasons why ﬁrms hold cash into three motives. The ﬁrst is the
transaction motive. John (1993) and Opler et al. (1999) ﬁnd that cash holdings aﬀect a ﬁrm’s Tobin Q,
R&D ratio, advertising expenditures, capital expenditures, scale, debt ratios, cash-to-cash cycles and cash
ﬂows. Kim et al. (1998) models a ﬁrm’s investment decisions on its liquid assets and discovers that the optimal
amount of liquidity is determined by a tradeoﬀ between the low return of liquid assets and the beneﬁt of
decreasing the need for costly external ﬁnancing. Opler et al. (1999) ﬁnd that the ﬁrms with the best access
to capital markets, such as large ﬁrms and ﬁrms with higher credit ratings, tend to hold lower ratios of cash
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dicted by the static tradeoﬀ model, in which managers maximize shareholder wealth.
The second motive is the precautionary motive. According to Opler et al. (1999), ﬁrms are expected to hold
more cash when they are short on cash ﬂow or ﬁnd it diﬃcult to obtain external capital, as they incur higher
costs if their ﬁnancial conditions worsen. Almeida et al. (2004) ﬁnd that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms tend to
invest in cash assets and that the opposite is true for unconstrained ﬁrms. Han and Qiu (2007) argue that the
cash holdings of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are positively related to cash ﬂow volatility, providing evidence
for the precautionary motive for a ﬁrm’s cash holdings. Acharya et al. (2012) conclude that the correlation
between cash holdings and credit risk is robustly positive. This puzzling ﬁnding can be explained by the pre-
cautionary motive for saving cash.
The third motive is the agency motive. Jensen (1986) ﬁnds that in ﬁrms lacking investment opportunities,
managers who are motivated by tunneling prefer to keep cash in their ﬁrms rather than pay dividends to inves-
tors. In terms of investor protection (Dittmar et al., 2003), evidence has shown that ﬁrms in countries where
investor rights are poorly protected hold up to twice as much cash as those with good investor protection. In
addition, when investor protection is poor, the factors that generally drive the need for cash holdings, such as
investment opportunities and asymmetric information, become less important. Dittmar and Jan (2007) and
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) ﬁnd that serious agency problems devalue ﬁrms’ cash holdings. Evidence from
Dittmar and Jan (2007) and Harford et al. (2008) shows that managers who are motivated by tunneling
are inclined to set up an equilibrium of excess cash holdings and are always good at consuming excess cash.
Nikolov and Whited (2011) discover that the agency problem of perquisite consumption is better than ﬁrm size
at explaining a cash holdings equilibrium and that the agency problem of ﬁrm size is better at explaining ﬁrm
value. Liu and Mauer (2011) ﬁnd that risk premiums are positively related to cash holdings but negatively
related to the value of cash holdings.
Other scholars have researched cash holdings in diﬀerent ways. Chen et al. (2012) ﬁnd that cash holdings in
the Chinese stock market decrease after the split-share reform. This appears to be more signiﬁcant for ﬁrms
with poorer corporate governance and stronger ﬁnancial constraints. Based on questionnaires posted to CFOs
in 29 countries, Lin et al. (2010) conclude that a line of credit is the key point inﬂuencing ﬁnancial liquidity.
Scholars also make contributions to the value of cash holdings. Faulkender and Wang (2006) test abnormal
stock returns in diﬀerent ﬁscal years. They consider the marginal value of cash declines given more cash hold-
ings, higher ﬁnancial leverage and easier access to the capital market. Cash dividends also decrease the mar-
ginal value compared with stock repurchases. Some research has determined the average cash value in all ﬁrms
to be $0.94. In theory, shareholders estimate that $1 in cash is equal to its book value. However, cash holdings
in ﬁrms with better investment opportunities enjoy a premium (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007), meaning
that $1 in cash is worth more than its book value. The opposite is also true. Many researchers have focused
on how corporate governance inﬂuences the value of cash holdings. Agency theory argues that cash value is
lower in countries in which investor protection is poor, as controlling shareholders are more likely to beneﬁt
from cash assets. In response to this theory, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) believe that the relationship between cash
holdings and ﬁrm value is weaker in countries with poorer investor protection. Firms with poor corporate gov-
ernance hold less cash because managers tend to consume cash more quickly rather than keep it in case of
ﬁnancial crisis (Harford et al., 2008). Dittmar and Jan (2007) ﬁnd that $1 in cash in poorly governed ﬁrms
ranges from only $0.42 to $0.88 in value. However, the amount rises to $2 in well-governed ﬁrms.
Moreover, when a ﬁrm’s corporate governance is poor, it is easier for managers to waste cash on projects that
do obvious damage to the ﬁrm’s value.
Scholars in China have also devoted themselves to such research. Zhang and Wu (2006) conclude that the
relation between cash and cash ﬂow sensitivity is signiﬁcantly positive in Chinese ﬁrms regardless of whether
they face ﬁnancial constraints. Under the economic conditions in China, better corporate governance lowers
cash holdings (Xin and Xu, 2006). In terms of local government governance, ﬁrms positioned in areas in which
the local government is properly governed hold less cash (Chen et al., 2011). In terms of agency problems,
agency costs play a role in the following relationship (Jiang and Bi, 2006). When agency costs are high, excess
cash holdings are negatively related to ﬁrm value. The relationship turns positive when agency costs decrease.
In terms of the separation of control and ownership rights, Shen et al. (2008) ﬁnd that state-owned controlling
shareholders prefer high levels of cash holdings. The value of cash holdings in these ﬁrms is RMB0.769. When
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RMB1.206. The market value of cash holdings in Chinese listed ﬁrms is generally lower than the book value,
which is more signiﬁcant in listed SOEs.
As mentioned previously, scholars have mostly focused on corporate governance and the legal environment
and have discussed whether the two inﬂuence the value of cash holdings. Little attention has been paid to per-
formance evaluation. The regulation of the EVA performance evaluation, issued by the SASAC in 2010, is
exogenous across ﬁrms in China. The EVA evaluation reﬂects a distinctly diﬀerent idea compared with past
evaluations. The regulation enforced by the SASAC provides an excellent opportunity to determine whether
the EVA evaluation aﬀects the management theory of the heads of CSOEs and the value of cash holdings.
Based on its results, this study should enrich the literature related to what inﬂuences the value of cash
holdings.
2.2. EVA performance evaluation
Stern Stewart introduced the EVA performance evaluation more than 20 years ago.1 The company believes
that EVA is more persuasive than other performance indicators in terms of driving stock prices, creating
wealth and interpreting changes in shareholder wealth (Stewart, 1994). The empirical ﬁndings of the correla-
tion between EVA and accounting performance have been diverse. Chen and Dodd (1997), Lehn and Makhija
(1997) and Kleiman (1999) ﬁnd that EVA supports value creation capabilities. Machuga et al. (2002) ﬁnd that
EVA can more accurately forecast future proﬁts than Earning Per Share (EPS). Lovata and Costigan (2002)
ﬁnd that defensive companies with low levels of insider ownership and institutional investors with large cash
holdings are more inclined to use the EVA performance evaluation system. However, Biddle et al. (1997) ﬁnd
no evidence to support EVA.
Conclusions as to whether EVA can improve corporate value and whether stock prices have more relevance
have been diverse. However, this does not aﬀect our analysis of the eﬀect of EVA on the value of cash hold-
ings. An EVA calculation must consider all of the costs involved, including the cost of equity capital.
Therefore, an EVA performance evaluation aﬀects an enterprise’s entire asset structure, and the enterprise
must adjust its cash holdings accordingly. The literature has not yet linked these two phases.
The SASAC deemed EVA an eﬀective performance evaluation mechanism that is able to improve business
eﬃciency and protect shareholder interests and is within the scope of SOEs to enforce. In this paper, we focus
on whether the EVA performance evaluation changes the philosophy of the heads of CSOEs in a way that
increases the value of their cash holdings. The literature thus far has not provided a clear answer to this point.
Therefore, this paper attempts to analyze the relationship between EVA performance evaluation and the cor-
porate value of cash holdings, link the fragmented literature related to EVA and the value of cash holdings
and test the eﬀect of the EVA performance evaluation in practice.
3. Institutional background, theoretical analysis and hypotheses
We begin by considering the executive pay reform process of Chinese companies. Employee pay was under
strict control before China’s reform and opening-up policies were launched in 1978. Factory director wages
were also subject to the rigid wage system. Wages were bonded to some non-ﬁnancial indexes, including enter-
prise location, industry, political rank (central or local), director’s administrative level, ﬁrm size, job type and
personal qualiﬁcations (Yueh, 2004). The State Council approved the “annual salary system,” combining the
basic and risky salaries of the Shanghai Hero Pan Company in 1992, thereby beginning the substantive reform
of the executive pay system. Although SOEs had undertaken many non-ﬁnancial goals, their operating per-
formance was generally measured by ﬁnancial indexes (Yueh, 2004).
Although China holds a theoretically positive attitude toward the value of managers, it regulates managers
in practice, bonding their salaries with those of employees. Around 2004, the State Council and SASAC issued1 Before the document is issued, the salary decisions made inside the companies probably make implicit use of value-making indexes to
evaluate the executives based on accounting performance. The release of the document may make these implicit value-making indexes
explicit.
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Interim Measures for Compensation of Persons-in-Charge at Central Enterprises and subsequently put them
into practice. They determine that the salaries of heads of CSOEs comprise basic and performance salaries
in addition to long-term incentive units and raise a speciﬁc measure to bond the regulation of their salaries
with business performance. The Interim Measures for Business Performance Appraisals of Persons-in-Charge
at Central Enterprises entered into eﬀect on January 1, 2007 and encourages enterprises to use the EVA index
to appraise their annual business performance. Enterprises using the EVA index and attaining EVA growth
are rewarded. According to the Interim Measures for Business Performance Appraisals of Persons-in-Charge
at Central Enterprises, the SASAC can only encourage enterprises to use the EVA index. The enterprises
are free to decide whether to use it based on the systems they have in place. Considering the spillover eﬀect
of the Interim Measures for Business Performance Appraisals of Persons-in-Charge at Central Enterprises, other
enterprises may imitate the CSOEs and use EVA as an appraisal index.2 This document may only expose the
implicit evaluation of the executives’ value creation. The Shandong Department of Finance published the
EVAs of all of the SOEs and community-owned enterprises and some private enterprises for three years begin-
ning in 2006 to maximally decrease the proﬁt manipulation of executives and accounting distortion perfor-
mance and coordinate the SASAC and enterprises to comprehensively evaluate executive performance. In
2010, the SASAC issued Order No. 22, requiring CSOEs to appraise executive performance using a combina-
tion of accounting proﬁt and EVA. EVA has a weight of around 40%.
Throughout the reform of the Chinese enterprise and “annual salary system,” salary contracts have gener-
ally been based on accounting proﬁt assessments. Although accounting performance is more easily manipulat-
ed for managers’ interests,3 we do not deny that such manipulation can act as an incentive for executives to
work harder. As managers decide salaries, their interests complement those of shareholders. Determining how
to encourage executives to improve short-term accounting performance without encouraging a loss in enter-
prise value is one of the most important tasks for managers. A series of indexes can measure the enterprise
value including stock prices, return on equity and EVA. Nevertheless, the systemic risk of the stock market
is beyond the control of executives (Sloan, 1993; Garvey et al., 2002). As a result, performance indexes, which
are bonded with the systemic risk of the stock market, go against executive incentives. Compared with stock
market indexes, the EVA index is under executive control, which reﬂects the eﬀort level of the executives.
Compared with accounting indexes, the EVA index is less likely to be manipulated and is able to reﬂect execu-
tives’ eﬀorts to ensure the long-term growth of their enterprises. When it is unsafe to observe CEOs’ perfor-
mance, EVA may oﬀer a better option by partly observing the controllable output (changes in stockholder
wealth) of their observable eﬀort (CEOs’ eﬀort) (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
EVA is a corporate ﬁnance, decision and compensation incentive system registered and carried out by Stern
Stewart. At its core, it is an evaluation methodology based on net operating proﬁt and the total cost of capital-
making proﬁt. It is calculated as follows: EVA = Net proﬁt after tax  Total capital cost = Net proﬁt after
tax  Capital  Cost of capital. According to the new conception of value creation, an enterprise’s value cre-
ation must be evaluated via EVA (Stewart, 1994). EVA truly reﬂects whether an enterprise is creating or losing
value in a certain period, considering all of the capital costs including equity capital. Occupation of funds is a
factor that inﬂuences EVA. The higher the amount of occupied of funds, the lower the EVA, ceteris paribus.
Meanwhile, the cash that enterprises hold comprises a large proportion of occupied funds. Therefore, cash
holdings and the eﬃciency of their investment are important factors inﬂuencing EVA. This paper focuses
on cash holding value.2 EVA has also undergone great improvement in China. Baosteel and Tsingtao Beer successfully introduced EVA at the end of 2002 and
took it as an opportunity to re-engineer their organizational construction and management processes and establish EVA salary and
ﬁnancial management systems. The government implemented an annual salary policy in Tsingtao Beer in 1999. However, the annual
salary system based on accounting numbers unfairly ignored the costs of capital. Combining EVA and accounting numbers increased the
transparency of the company, its investment eﬃciency and the value of its human resources (2002, http://business.sohu.com). Other
famous enterprises that have adopted EVA include China Construction Bank, Li-Ning, China Construction and FAW Group.
3 Before the document is issued, the salary decisions made inside the companies probably make implicit use of value-making indexes to
evaluate the executives based on accounting performance. The release of the document may make these implicit value-making indexes
explicit.
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1966; Mulligan, 1997), precautionary motivation (Opler et al., 1999; Riddick and Whited, 2009; Bates et al.,
2009) and agency cost motivation (Jensen, 1986; Dittmar and Jan, 2007). The earnings from cash holdings
maintain currency for daily operations, decrease the chance of a ﬁnancial dilemma and ensure that an invest-
ment policy is not aﬀected by a lack of money. However, cash holdings involve certain managerial and oppor-
tunity costs. Too high a cash holding may inﬂuence executives’ investment behavior and create agency costs
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As such, the earnings and costs of cash holdings must be balanced.
According to the principal-agent model presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976), executives allocate enter-
prise resources out of personal interest due to information asymmetry and limited rationality, including cash.
When an enterprise’s performance harms stockholder interests, the motivation of its executives’ cash holding
behavior assimilates the theory of free cash ﬂow. According to this theory, massive cash holdings complement
executives’ interests. The separation of the two rights pushes executives to use their residual control rights to
hold cash. It allows executives to fulﬁll self-serving behavior such as perquisite consumption and adding sub-
sidies. Meanwhile, massive cash holdings result in blind investment, which focuses on expansion rather than
stockholder interests.
Against China’s institutional background, the CSOE as an institutional outcome both exhibits the charac-
teristics of an enterprise and diﬀers from enterprises in many ways. CSOEs do not have a clear property rights
system, which results in the circumstance of “undeserved owners.” Jensen and Meckling (1976) believe that the
relationship between stockholders and managers is essentially a contract. By signing contracts, principals
authorize agents to perform certain responsibilities on behalf of the principals themselves and bestow certain
decision-making powers upon those agents. The loss of company value associated with this principal-agent
relationship is known as an agency cost. In CSOEs, where property rights and principals are uncertain, a seri-
ous agency problem may arise between principals and agents that may incur agency costs. Meanwhile, CSOE
executives enforce a compensation regulation (Chen et al., 2005) that weakens the incentive institution eﬀect,
forcing executives to add income from residual controls in compensation. In this circumstance, CSOE execu-
tives prefer to expand their enterprises to fulﬁll more self-serving behavior such as perquisite consumption,
which raises their enterprises’ agency costs and inﬂuences their value. In more microcosmic terms, it lowers
the eﬃciency of cash use, wastes money on projects and investments that damage the company’s value and
lowers the company’s cash-holding value. As CSOEs are at the highest level of China’s enterprise administra-
tion system, their agency problems are self-evident. This paper seeks to determine whether the agency prob-
lems of executives aﬀect their behavior and the value of their cash holdings. It also considers whether EVA
evaluation can change the behavior of executives and enhance their companies’ cash-holding value.
Designing a set of reasonable incentive measures to decrease the loss of enterprise value resulting from
agency costs is an important part of principal-agent theory. Therefore, alleviating the agency problems
between CSOE owners and executives is a way of enhancing CSOEs’ value-making capacity, investment eﬃ-
ciency and cash-holding value. Establishing eﬀective regulation and incentive institutions against such a back-
ground and synchronizing the interests of owners and executives are the keys to solving these problems. An
appropriate evaluation of executive performance is the premise of an eﬀective incentive. When the indexes of
performance evaluation have been conﬁrmed, executive behavior reaches a benchmark and executives perform
in a way that maximizes their own interests. Therefore, favorable performance evaluation indexes alleviate
agency problems and guide executives to make decisions and organize their enterprises’ manufacturing and
operating performance on behalf of stockholder interests.
EVA evaluation began in 2010. The EVA index was added on the basis of accounting performance eval-
uation and had a greater weight. EVA is adjusted on the basis of accounting performance and equals the eco-
nomic proﬁt less the capital costs, including the equity capital cost. Therefore, the added EVA evaluation
aﬀects executives as much as capital costs do. Capital costs comprise the occupied capital and weighted aver-
age cost of capital. Executives have three approaches to enhancing EVA. First, they can eﬃciently operate
their existing businesses and capital and increase their operating income. Second, they can be more prudent
in terms of investment, which becomes eﬃcient only when the return on investment exceeds the cost of capital.
Third, they can increase the operating eﬃciency of capital and add the current turnover of capital. Executives
increase both EVA and accounting proﬁt when they increase their operating income. Decreasing the occupied
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holdings and investments are the key points to increasing EVA.
Even more crucial is that the EVA evaluation policy implemented by the SASAC also transmits a signal to
the heads of CSOEs, which means that the SASAC focuses on evaluating both the value-making abilities and
accounting performance of enterprises. The SASAC hopes to enhance the value-making abilities of enterprises
by enhancing the performance evaluation model and protecting stockholder interests to a greater degree. The
heads of CSOEs can observe the SASAC’s intention and may adjust their enterprises’ operations and manage-
ment based on their charges. Of course, they must balance their own gains and losses, which can take the
forms of personal salaries, control powers and chances of promotion.
China advanced a series of macroscopic regulations to prevent the polarization of employee income and
demonstrate the principal of fairness. In practice, the government regulates executive income and some
employee income (Chen et al., 2005). The main measure of this regulation is to bond executive and employee
income and set a directional line for employee income. For example, in 2002, the SASAC issued the rule that
executive salaries cannot exceed 12 times the salaries of employees, followed by the provinces. In 2004 and
2009, the SASAC and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security issued and implemented their
Interim Measures for Business Performance Appraisals of Persons-in-Charge at Central Enterprises and
Guiding Opinions on Further Regulating the Salary Management of Persons-in-Charge at Central Enterprises,
which clearly state that SOE executive salaries must comprise a basic annual salary, a performance salary
and income from mid-/long-term incentives. The basic annual salary is bonded with the average salary of
employees at central enterprises. These regulations have been broken to diﬀering degrees over the growth
of China’s economy and the growth of SOE proﬁts. Tremendously overpriced salaries have occasionally
appeared and serve as the best examples of these breakthroughs. Therefore, salaries remain one of the most
important ways of incentivizing executives. Although executives can achieve control power to maximize their
self-interest through perquisite consumption, the compensation incentive remains a relatively important incen-
tive measure and executives do not waive higher salaries in exchange for personal control power.
The incentive of political promotion is as meaningful as monetized salary incentives and personal control
power. The heads of CSOEs are located near or directly within China’s political center and have greater poten-
tial for political promotion. Many heads of CSOEs have been directly promoted as provincial oﬃcials. For
example, Finance Minister Xie Louwei served as the president of CIC and the Governor of Fujian
Province used to be the CEO of Sinopec. CSOEs have become incubators for economic oﬃcials and political
promotion may be more of an incentive for the heads of CSOEs than making money or achieving personal
proﬁt. The SASAC is the evaluation and regulation institution of the heads of CSOEs. Its evaluation of these
heads can decide their promotion to a great degree. Therefore, the heads of CSOEs have reasons to improve
the operating ideas of their enterprises and maximize value according to the wishes of the SASAC. As such,
creating value has become a central eﬀort of the heads of CSOEs in the daily operating process.
CSOE executives are in the optimal position of choosing what should be evaluated and created to maximize
their own interests. The SASAC introduced the Interim Measures for Business Performance Appraisals of
Persons-in-Charge at Central Enterprises in 2010, with the objective of choosing reasonable performance eval-
uation indexes to solve the agency problem between CSOE stockholders and executives. The SASAC formerly
used return on equity as the main performance evaluation index before EVA. Indexes based on accounting
performance may push enterprises to go after net proﬁt and ignore the costs of equity capital. As a result,
the value of an enterprise’s stockholders suﬀers as the enterprise expands. CSOEs generally enjoy loose fund-
ing policies and endure lower cost of debt capital. Therefore, executives can easily ignore the costs of capital
when making operating decisions. EVA comprehensively accounts for the total capital costs and eliminates the
disadvantage of classic accounting computation, which occupies the money of stockholders for free. As
rational “economic men,” CSOE executives have a greater motive to think about the costs of equity and debt
capital and spend more money on projects that may truly increase the value of their enterprises after the eval-
uation policy has been taken into account.
According to the premise of the separation of ownership and control rights, inside executives use residual
control power to aﬀect cash-holding decisions and encourage investments that damage stockholder value
through abnormally high cash holdings (Jensen, 1986) and to maximize their personal control power. It is
relatively easy for SOEs to gain the credit support of banks and equity capital from the capital market, which
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underinvestment, both of which decrease a company’s value and cash holdings.
The heads of CSOEs may use cash holdings more prudently and consider the costs of capital after an EVA
evaluation. Furthermore, overinvestment and underinvestment may be curbed to a certain level. Therefore, we
present our ﬁrst hypothesis as follows:
H1(a). The SASAC’s EVA evaluation policy lowers the overinvestment of CSOEs.
H1(b). The SASAC’s EVA evaluation policy lowers the underinvestment of CSOEs.
The corporate value of cash holdings often decreases due to underinvestment and overinvestment (Jensen,
1986). If overinvestment or underinvestment improves after an EVA performance evaluation, then the value of
the CSOE’s cash holdings is enhanced due to the eﬀorts of the head of the CSOE to actively or passively
improve its business philosophy.
There are two ways to improve EVA. The ﬁrst is to lower capital productivity. The second is to decrease the
weighted cost of capital calculated from the costs of debt and equity. The more cash held by an enterprise, the
larger the enterprise’s occupied capital. Cash returns and even negative cash returns are almost zero. The cost
of capital remains the same under the weighted condition. The more cash held by an enterprise, the more the
occupied capital is wasted. The higher the cost of capital, the lower the EVA.
However, cash holdings also have a transaction motivation (Miller and Orr, 1966; Mulligan, 1997) and pre-
cautionary motivation (Opler et al., 1999; Riddick and Whited, 2009; Bates et al., 2009). Miller and Orr (1966)
support the cash transaction motivation. Mulligan (1997) argues that an enterprise stores less cash due to the
cost savings motivation of economic scale. Precautionary motivation supporters believe that when companies
enter the capital market, they hold more cash to cope with unexpected situations (Opler et al., 1999; Riddick
and Whited, 2009). If enterprises face risks such as a higher risk of cash ﬂows, they will retain a large amount
of cash to deal with these risks. Therefore, a certain amount of cash held by a company is accompanied by
more investment opportunities (Mikkelson and Partch, 2003).
Under the pressure of the EVA performance evaluation, management seeks to decrease the cost of capital
and maintain normal business operations. Therefore, its ultimate goal is to control cash within a reasonable
scope to improve the value of the enterprise and its personal interests. Cash holding management can also
increase the value of cash holdings to some extent.
Because EVA performance evaluation is only enforced within CSOEs, the eﬀect of a CSOE’s operating phi-
losophy and management style may be stronger than that of an LSOE. Therefore, the CSOEs’ performance
evaluation mode has a stronger eﬀect on cash holdings than that of general SOEs. In summary, we make the
following hypotheses.
H2(a). The value of a CSOE’s cash holdings increases following an EVA performance evaluation.
H2(b). Compared with those of a non-CSOE, the value of CSOE’s cash holdings increases following an EVA
performance evaluation.4. Research design
4.1. Research sample
As this paper focuses on the association between EVA evaluation performance and the value of CSOE cash
holdings, we choose A-share listed companies under the control of central enterprises as our research sample.
Considering that the share reform process may aﬀect the value of a company, we use data from the 2006–2011
period. When the SASAC of the State Council was ﬁrst established in 2003, it managed 196 enterprises.
Through recombination, this number decreased to 117 by the end of November 2011. According to the list
of state-controlled stock codes, the sample comprises 1128 companies. After excluding companies with missing
data and ST and *ST companies, the number of companies decreases to 987. To investigate the eﬀect of the
EVA appraisal system, we compare CSOEs with general SOEs. Therefore, non-CSOEs are also included in the
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uation policy. To avoid the disparity inherent in CSOEs and LSOEs, we adhere to the principle of same year,
same industry and similar total assets and ﬁnd 987 matching samples for the 987 companies. The ﬁnal sample
is 1974. Considering the inﬂuence of outliers, we winsorize the continuous variables at the 0.01 level. We
obtain company ﬁnancial data from the WIND advisory ﬁnancial and CCER databases.
4.2. Model design
The regression model and variable design used in this paper mainly follow those used by Pinkowitz and
Williamson (2007). To test our ﬁrst hypothesis, we design the following model:4 Th
SASAOverinvest ¼ a1 þ b1centralþ b2impþ b3imp  centralþ other variablesþ e ðModelð1ÞÞ
Our model relating factors to the value of cash holdings relies on a study by Pinkowitz et al. (2006). To test
H2, we include the dummy variable imp of the EVA evaluation year in our model and modify the design as
follows:V ¼ a1 þ b1cashþ b2impþ b3imp  cashþ other variablesþ e ðModelð2ÞÞ
V ¼ a1 þ b1cashþ b2impþ b2centralþ b2imp  cashþ b2central  cashþ b2imp  central
þ b3imp  central  cashþ other variablesþ e ðModelð3ÞÞ4.3. Variable deﬁnitions
Corporate market value is treated as dependent variable V. Due to the past split-share structure of the
Chinese capital market, it consists of the market value of circulating shares, the value of non-tradable shares
and the value of corporate debt. As the value of corporate debt lacks market data, we use the book value of
liabilities instead. Due to the share reform of CSOEs and other reasons, the value of non-tradable shares does
not have a corresponding market price and the transfer price of non-tradable shares is generally based on net
assets. Therefore, following Xia and Fang (2005), we use the product of non-tradable shares and net assets per
share as the value of non-tradable shares.
Following Faulkender and Wang (2006), we deﬁne cash holdings as cash and tradable ﬁnancial assets.
Before International Accounting Standards (IAS) were introduced to China, similar tradable ﬁnancial assets
were reﬂected in short-term investment items. After IAS were introduced, they were reﬂected in tradable ﬁnan-
cial asset items. As the sample period in this paper begins in 2006, we add the two together, along with mone-
tary funds. The result can be considered a proxy variable for cash holdings.
We calculate the EVA for each company according to the Temporary regulations of performance evaluation
on the central state enterprise legal person, which were revised and implemented by the SASAC. EVA is equal
to the net operating proﬁt after tax less the capital costs. The formula is written as follows: EVA = the net
operating proﬁt after tax  the capital costs = the net operating proﬁt after tax-adjusted capital * average cost
of capital rate. The net operating proﬁt after tax is calculated as follows: net proﬁt + (interest expense + re-
search and development expenses adjustments  non-recurring income adjustments * 50%) * (1–25%). The
adjusted capital is calculated as follows: average owner’s equity + average liabilities  average interest-free
liabilities-average construction-in-process. The average cost of capital rate, which should be 5.5% in principle,
can be adjusted slightly in accordance with the circumstances. It should stay the same three years after con-
ﬁrmation.4 Following the regulation, we adjust the net operating proﬁt after tax and the capital, with a cost-
of-capital rate of 5.5% required in principle. We then calculate EVA manually. To control for the inﬂuence of
enterprise scale on EVA, we use the rate equal to EVA divided by the capital used as a variable of EVA.
As we account for the eﬀect of the EVA performance evaluation on the value of cash holdings and excessive
investment, we calculate the excess investment variable. The measurement of excessive investment mainlye 22nd Temporary regulations of performance evaluation on the central state enterprise legal person, revised and implemented by the
C.
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ments. The value investment is equal to the depreciation and amortization of the previous period. The new
investment is divided into expected and unexpected investments. The expected investment is relevant to cor-
porate growth opportunities, ﬁnancing constraints and other factors. The unexpected investment is equal to
the new investment less the expected investment. In regression Model (1), the dependent variable NIt is the
new investment (equal to the total investment less the value investment). The ﬁtted values NI * t reﬂect the
expected investment. The residual e is the unexpected overinvestment. A positive sign indicates excess
investment.5 In






Our study is an event study that focuses on the inﬂuence that the EVA performance evaluation policy had
on the value of CSOE cash holdings in 2010. The key to an event study is whether the event window is “clean”
and whether something that can aﬀect the cash holding value exists or a similar event occurs. We review the
events of the capital market during 2010 and ﬁnd that the Central Bank raised the RRR six times in 2010,5
from 15.5% at the end of 2009 to 18.5% at the end of 2010. Studies have shown that monetary policy is an
important factor aﬀecting cash holdings (Chen and Chen, 2012). Thus, we control for the monetary policy
per year (RRR). If the monetary policy is adjusted several times, we take its maximum value.
Diﬀerences in a company’s operating, investment and ﬁnancing capacities may aﬀect any changes in the
company’s value. To estimate the value of the cash holdings, we require control variables that may aﬀect com-
pany value. Cf is the company’s annual operating cash ﬂow. Na is the company’s net assets, or the balance of
assets less its cash and trading ﬁnancial assets. GI is the annual dividend and interest paid by the company,
represented by the dividend and interest in the cash ﬂow statement. Capex is the company’s capital expendi-
ture, represented by the cash used to build and dispose of ﬁxed, intangible and other long-term assets. Xt is the
level of variable x in year t. dXt is the change in variable x from years t  1 to t, or Xt  Xt1, and dXt+1 is the
change in variable x from years t to t + 1, or Xt+1  Xt. Referring to the research of Pinkowitz et al. (2006), we
standardize all of the variables by dividing them by total assets. To control for year and industry eﬀects, we
add year and industry control variables to our model, represented by Year and Industry, respectively. The
speciﬁc variables are deﬁned in Table 1.
5. Descriptive statistics
5.1. Descriptive statistics: Analysis of main variables
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the main variables. The mean value of CSOEs is 1.611. The mean
value of non-CSOEs is higher, at 1.667. This illustrates that the total market value of non-CSOEs exceeds that
of CSOEs. The mean value of Cash is 0.152 for CSOEs and 0.16 for non-CSOEs. The mean value of EVA,
which represents the value creation of CSOEs, is 0.021, indicating that companies create EVA by 2.1% on
average. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the main variables.
Considering the two cases of enterprise value creation and value loss and the eﬀect of policy implementa-
tion, we investigate the descriptive statistics for CSOEs by group. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for
the main variables in enterprises that create value and suﬀer value loss. The descriptive statistics for the main
variables in diﬀerent years are shown in Tables 4 and 5.
According to Table 3, 416 enterprises suﬀer value loss, accounting for 42% of the 987 observations. The
enterprises that create value account for 58%, indicating that the majority of CSOEs create value.
However, the 42% value loss rate reveals that the value creation ability of CSOEs requires improvement.
The mean value of 1.686 for the enterprises that create value exceeds that of 1.506 for the enterprises that suf-
fer value damage. The level of cash holdings in enterprises that create value is also higher.2007, the Central Bank began to raise the RRR to control the currency circulation of the commercial banks. It did so 10 times in




V Market value of the company (Company’s equity value + creditor value)/total assets
EVA Economic value added rate Economic value added/capital occupancy
Imp Implementation Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for all of the years after
year 2009 and 0 otherwise
VC Value creation Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if EVA exceeds 0 and 0
otherwise
Cash Level of cash holding Cash and cash equivalents/total assets at the end of year t
Cft Cash ﬂow from operating activities Cash ﬂow from operating activities/total assets at the end of year t
dCft Change in cash ﬂow from operating
activities
(CFO at the end of year t  CFO at the end of year t  1)/total
assets
dCft+1 Change in cash ﬂow from operating
activities
(CFO at the end of year t + 1  CFO at the end of year t)/total
assets
dNat Change in net assets (Net assets at the end of year t  net assets at the end of year
t  1)/total assets
dNat+1 Change in net assets (Net assets at the end of year t + 1  net assets at the end of year
t)/total assets
GIt Dividend and interest paid Dividend and interest paid in year t/total assets
dGIt Change in dividend and interest paid (Dividend and interest paid in year t  dividend and interest paid
in year t  1)/total assets
dItt+1 Change in dividend and interest paid (Dividend and interest paid in year t + 1  dividend and interest
paid in year t)/total assets
Capext Capital expenditures Capital expenditures at the end of year t/total assets
dCapext Change in capital expenditures (Capital expenditures at the end of year t  capital expenditures at
the end of year t  1)/total assets
dCapext+1 Change in capital expenditures (Capital expenditures at the end of year t + 1  capital
expenditures at the end of year t)/total assets
Mp Monetary policy RRR per year
TIt Total investment (Cash used to build ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and long-term
assets in the current period + cash for equity investment + cash for
debt investment)/total assets in the previous period
MIt Hedging investment (Depreciation of ﬁxed assets + amortization of intangible assets in
the previous period)/total assets in the previous period
NIt New investment (Total investment  hedging investment)/total assets in the
previous period
NI*t Expected investment Fitted value of the model
Overinvest Overinvest Residuals of Model (4)
GROWTHt1 Growth Tobin’s Q value in the previous period
DDEBT New debt (New loans + new bonds in the current period)/total assets in the
previous period
DEQUITYt New equity ﬁnancing New equity ﬁnancing in the current period/total assets in the
previous period
LEVt1 Debt ratio Asset  liability ratio in the previous period
SIZEt1 Size Natural logarithm of total assets in the previous period
ARt1 Excess return on equity The previous yield  the previous market yield
Industry Industry dummy variables Classiﬁed by one-digit industry codes of CSRC
Year Year dummy variables Five dummy variables from 2007 to 2011
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afterward. The lowest company value is 1.098, indicating that the Asian Financial Crisis had a negative eﬀect
on corporate growth, consistent with the macroeconomic environment circumstance. In addition, from the
end of 2008–2010, the development and implementation of the national “4 trillion” investment policy also
aﬀect company value. The mean value rebounds to 1.841 in 2009 and reaches its highest level of 2.019 in 2010.
The mean level of CSOE cash holdings ﬂuctuates between 2006 and 2011, reaching its lowest level of 0.145
in 2008 and its highest level of 0.164 in 2009. From 2006 to 2009, EVA maintains a relatively stable mean val-
ue, with a maximum of 0.015 and a minimum of 0.010, representing a range of no more than 20% and a small
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for the main variables.
Variable Number of observations Mean Median Standard deviation
CSOEs
V 987 1.611 1.253 1.029
Cash 987 0.152 0.122 0.12
EVA 987 0.021 0.009 0.076
Cf 987 0.048 0.047 0.078
Gl 987 0.034 0.03 0.025
Capex 987 0.061 0.043 0.055
Non-CSOEs
V 987 1.667 1.399 0.997
Cash 987 0.16 0.133 0.109
Cf 987 0.063 0.058 0.077
Gl 987 0.027 0.024 0.018
Capex 987 0.061 0.049 0.058
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for main variables in enterprises that create value and suﬀer value loss.
Variables Value loss Value creation
Number of observations Mean Number of observations Mean
V 416 1.506 571 1.686
Cash 416 0.128 571 0.169
EVA 416 0.04 571 0.065
Note: if EVA > 0, it is an enterprise that creates value; otherwise, it is an enterprise that suﬀers value damage.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for the main variables by year.
Year V Cash EVA
2006 1.1 0.142 0.012
2007 1.969 0.147 0.015
2008 1.098 0.145 0.01
2009 1.841 0.164 0.013
2010 2.019 0.159 0.029
2011 1.543 0.151 0.026
Table 5a
Panel A: Eﬀect of the implementation of policy on CSOE eﬃciency.
Variables Before 2010 After 2010 The mean test (T)
Number of observations Mean Number of observations Mean
V 661 1.511 326 1.812 24.63***
Cash 661 0.15 326 0.155 23.44***
EVA 661 0.017 326 0.028 7.33***
ROA 661 0.045 326 0.051 17.90***
ROE 661 0.069 326 0.096 18.61
OROA 661 0.037 326 0.043 15.06***
AR 661 0.003 326 0.002 2.41**
Overinvest 661 0.011 326 0.002 1.36
Note: * represents signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level.
** Represents signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
*** Represents signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
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Table 5b
Panel B: Eﬃciency of CSOEs and non-CSOEs before and after the policy implementation.
Policy implementation Indexes CSOEs Non-CSOEs Mean value test
Before ROA 0.045 0.054 17.57***
ROE 0.069 0.088 10.77***
OROA 0.037 0.046 13.97***
AR 0.0033 0.003 4.01***
Overinvest 0.011 0.004 1.36
After ROA 0.05 0.047 19.26***
ROE 0.096 0.058 14.54***
OROA 0.043 0.039 17.51***
AR 0.0019 0.0018 3.10***
Overinvest 0.002 0.01 0.59
Note: ROA = total proﬁt/total assets, ROE = net proﬁt/net assets, OROA = operating proﬁt/total assets and AR = annual return on
equity  market returns. Overinvest is the excess investment variable, calculated according to the Richardson (2006) model.
*Represents signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level.
**Represents signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
*** Represents signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
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0.029 and 0.026, respectively, an obvious increase compared with previous values.
5.2. Does the EVA performance evaluation policy improve company eﬃciency?
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the main variables before and after policy implementation. The
SASAC implemented the EVA performance evaluation of the heads of CSOEs in 2010. The number of obser-
vations after 2010 is 326, accounting for 33% of the total sample. The mean company value of CSOEs is 1.511
before 2010 and rises to 1.812 after 2010. The diﬀerence in company value before and after the implementation
of the policy is obvious. Through diﬀerences tests, we ﬁnd the value of t, representing the diﬀerence in com-
pany value, which is 24.63 around 2010 and signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. The implemented policy thus improves
the value of the CSOEs and enterprise growth changed around 2010.
The level of CSOE cash holdings is 0.15 before 2010 and rises to 0.155 after 2010, showing no obvious dif-
ference in mean value. The value-creating ability of CSOEs, i.e., the mean value of EVA, is 0.017 before 2010
and rises to 0.028 after 2010 without obvious improvement. Through signiﬁcance testing, we ﬁnd that the val-
ue of t representing the diﬀerence of EVA is 2.055 around 2010 and signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. The policy
was therefore eﬀectively implemented and improves the value-creating ability of the CSOEs. We also examine
the eﬀect of the EVA performance evaluation policy on accounting and market performance. The test results
show that after the policy implementation, ROA, ROE and OROA (operating proﬁt/total assets) increase sig-
niﬁcantly at the 0.01 level. AR also signiﬁcantly increases at the 0.05 level. Univariate test results show that the
EVA performance evaluation system improves CSOE eﬃciency.
We test the eﬃciency of the CSOEs and non-CSOEs before and after the policy implementation. Table 5
Panel B shows the test results.Table 6
Pearson correlation coeﬃcients of the main variables.
Variables V Cash EVA Imp
V 1
Cash 0.2100*** 1
EVA 0.2033*** 0.2211*** 1
Imp 0.1372*** 0.0198 0.0653** 1
Note: * represents signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level.
** Represents signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
*** Represents signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
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that of non-CSOEs. However, ROE of CSOEs is signiﬁcantly higher after the policy implementation. The
results indicate that the implemented policy improves accounting performance. Judging from the market per-
formance, the excess returns on CSOE stocks are signiﬁcantly higher around the policy implementation.
5.3. Correlation analysis of the main variables
We conduct a correlation analysis of the main CSOE variables. The Pearson correlation coeﬃcient matrix
in Table 6 shows that the variable correlations are consistent with expectations and also provide a basis for the
study’s hypotheses. Cash and V have a signiﬁcant positive correlation at the 1% level, consistent with the ﬁnd-
ings of previous studies. This indicates a positive correlation between a company’s cash holdings and value,
and that an increase in the former can increase the latter. EVA and V also have a signiﬁcant positive corre-
lation at the 1% level, indicating that the stronger a company’s ability to create value, the higher the compa-
ny’s value. Furthermore, Imp and V have a signiﬁcant positive correlation at the 1% level, indicating that the
implemented policy eﬀectively improves company value. EVA and Cash are signiﬁcantly associated at the 1%
and 5% levels, as are Imp and EVA. Other control variables are also signiﬁcantly correlated at a certain level.
In addition, to avoid the eﬀects of multicollinearity on the results, we investigate the variance inﬂation factors
(VIFs) of the variables used in the regression. The VIFs of the variables are less than 5.
6. Empirical tests
6.1. Test of H1
We conduct an OLS multiple regression for the eﬀect of the level of cash holdings of the CSOEs, LSOEs
and entire sample on overinvestment and underinvestment before and after the policy implementation. Table 7
Panel A shows the results.
As shown in regression (1) in Table 7 Panel A, the cash regression coeﬃcient of 0.129 is signiﬁcantly positive
at the 0.05 level, indicating that the more cash a SOE holds before the implementation of the EVA performance
evaluation policy, the more it overinvests. The regression coeﬃcient of the interaction term imp * cash is
0.053, indicating that the eﬀect of cash holdings on overinvestment is weakened but not signiﬁcantly so after
the policy implementation. The EVA performance evaluation policy has less of an eﬀect on the LSOEs and
overinvestments. Regression (2) focuses on CSOEs. The cash regression coeﬃcient is 0.172 and is signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level. The regression coeﬃcient of imp * cash is 0.13, which is also signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
The results show that the more cash holdings a CSOE has, the more likely it is to overinvest before policy imple-
mentation. In addition, the inﬂuencing factor is 0.042 (0.1720.13), indicating that the eﬀect of cash holdings
on overinvestments is signiﬁcantly weakened after the policy implementation. However, in regression (3), which
focuses on LSOEs, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant change before and after the policy implementation.
To further examine the eﬀect of the EVA performance evaluation policy on CSOE overinvestment and
underinvestment, we divide the CSOE sample into overinvestment and underinvestment sub-samples, corre-
sponding with regression (4) and regression (5), respectively. In regression (4), the cash regression coeﬃcient
is 0.257 and the imp * cash regression coeﬃcient is 0.158. Both values are signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, indi-
cating that the EVA policy implementation signiﬁcantly decreases the eﬀect of CSOEs’ cash holdings on over-
investment. However, in regression (5), we do not ﬁnd the CSOEs’ cash holdings to have a great eﬀect on
underinvestment before or after the implementation of the EVA performance evaluation policy.
In regression (6), we examine the diﬀerences in CSOEs and LSOEs before and after policy implementation.
The regression coeﬃcient of imp * central * cash is 0.198. It fails to pass the signiﬁcance test, probably because
the cash holdings inﬂuence diﬀerent investments in diﬀerent directions before and after the policy implemen-
tation. Regressions (7) and (8) investigate the eﬀects of the two types of enterprises on overinvestment and
underinvestment before and after the policy implementation. The regression coeﬃcient of imp * central * cash
is 0.233 in regression (7) and signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. The result shows that the eﬀect of CSOEs’ cash
holdings on overinvestment is signiﬁcantly weakened after the implementation of the EVA policy compared
with those of LSOEs. The regression coeﬃcient of imp * central * cash is 0.266 in regression (8) and fails to
228 Y. Shen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 213–241pass the signiﬁcance test. This indicates that the level of CSOEs’ cash holdings does not improve underinvest-
ment after the EVA policy implementation compared with LSOEs.
We use the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method, which has its own inherent limitations (Bertrand et al., 2004), to
investigate the economic consequences of the CSOEs after EVA performance evaluation. The eﬀects of the cash
holdings of CSOEs and LSOEs on investment may have their own systemic diﬀerences. Using the interaction
term imp * central * cash may not allow us to solve this problem. Thus, we conduct a falsiﬁcation test as a sup-
plement to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method. We cross-multiply the dummy variables and the central * cash
variable of each year to set a multitude of three intersecting variables. If we do not ﬁnd the same result before
and after the policy implementation, we conﬁrm the empirical results obtained from the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
method and conclude that the policy implementation leads to a systemic change in the two types of enterprises.
Table 7 Panel B shows the regression results. From 2006 to 2009, the cross-variable regression coeﬃcients are
insigniﬁcant regardless of overinvestment or underinvestment. This veriﬁes the empirical results obtained from
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method to some extent. Thus, the regression results in Table 7 support H1.
6.2. Test of H2
After validating H1, we further investigate the eﬀect of the level of cash holdings on ﬁrm value. Table 8
shows the results.
According to Table 8 Panel A, the regression coeﬃcients of cash are 1.118 and 1.262 in regressions (1) and
(2) before and after the EVA performance evaluation of CSOEs, respectively, and signiﬁcant at the 0.01 and
0.05 levels, respectively. In regression (3), the regression coeﬃcient of imp * cash is 1.157 and signiﬁcant at the
0.01 level. This indicates that the eﬀect of cash on ﬁrm value increases signiﬁcantly after CSOEs’ implemen-
tation of the EVA assessment. Compared with no assessment, ﬁrm value increases 1.157 units when the ratio
of monetary capital to total assets increases by 1 unit and is economically signiﬁcant. In contrast, the regres-
sion coeﬃcients of the cash variable and imp*cash are not signiﬁcant in regression (4) for LSOEs.
In regression (5), which covers the entire sample, the regression coeﬃcient of imp * central * cash is 1.701
and signiﬁcant at 0.05 level, indicating that the value of CSOEs’ cash holdings improves signiﬁcantly after the
EVA performance evaluation compared with that of LSOEs.
We also conduct a falsiﬁcation test for the value of the cash holdings. Table 8 Panel B shows the speciﬁc
regression results.
As shown in the falsiﬁcation test results in Table 8 Panel B, from 2006 to 2009, the interaction term has no
signiﬁcant positive relationship with the dependent variable, reinforcing the conclusion of regression (5) in
Table 8 Panel A. Compared with the value of the cash holdings of LSOEs, the value of CSOEs’ cash holdings
signiﬁcantly increases after the implementation of the EVA policy.
Therefore, the regression results shown in Table 8 support H2.
6.3. Does curbing overinvestment or improving underinvestment account for the increase in value of the cash
holdings?
In our analysis, we ﬁnd that CSOEs signiﬁcantly decrease their overinvestment levels and improve the value
of their cash holdings after implementing the EVA performance evaluation, beginning in 2010. In the theore-
tical analysis, our claim is that the EVA performance evaluation ultimately aﬀects the value of the cash hold-
ings by improving corporate investment. We conduct a test to determine whether the EVA performance
evaluation policy improves the value of the cash holdings by curbing overinvestment or improving underin-
vestment. Table 9 shows the results.
Table 9 shows the value of the cash holdings under diﬀerent investment conditions. In regression (1), which
focuses on the CSOE overinvestment sub-sample, the regression coeﬃcient of cash is 1.814 and signiﬁcant at
the 0.01 level. This indicates that cash holdings have a positive eﬀect on the value of CSOEs that invest exces-
sively before the policy implementation and no signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the value after the policy imple-
mentation. In regression (2), which focuses on the CSOE underinvestment sub-sample, the regression
coeﬃcient of cash is 0.566, indicating that cash holdings have a negative yet insigniﬁcant eﬀect on CSOE
value before the policy implementation. The regression coeﬃcient of imp*cash is 1.317 and signiﬁcant at
Table 7a
Panel A: OLS multiple regression of the eﬀect on overinvestment before and after implementation of the EVA performance evaluation policy.



















Overinvestment Underinvestment Whole sample Overinvestment Underinvestment
Cash 0.129** 0.172*** 0.199 0.257*** 0.040 0.148* 0.162*** 0.075
(1.970) (5.148) (1.573) (7.263) (0.759) (1.654) (4.545) (0.412)
Imp 0.003 0.028** 0.065 0.001 0.026* 0.057* 0.013 0.065
(0.138) (2.414) (1.299) (0.0781) (1.792) (1.722) (0.956) (1.016)
Central 0.036 0.010 0.109**
(1.473) (0.952) (2.298)
imp_cash 0.053 0.130*** 0.056 0.158*** 0.005 0.059 0.070 0.262
(0.513) (2.698) (0.271) (2.922) (0.0691) (0.389) (1.214) (0.754)
central_cash 0.069 0.100** 0.332
(0.571) (2.171) (1.233)
imp_central 0.088** 0.010 0.095
(2.186) (0.598) (1.247)
imp_central_cash 0.164 0.233*** 0.266
(0.791) (2.936) (0.587)
Cf 2.481*** 2.307*** 2.840*** 1.888*** 2.155*** 2.519*** 1.884*** 2.331***
(23.81) (41.33) (13.52) (24.55) (25.41) (24.13) (38.00) (9.311)
dcf_t 2.534*** 2.370*** 2.712*** 2.024*** 2.245*** 2.561*** 2.035*** 2.409***
(30.97) (62.29) (16.22) (35.64) (34.29) (31.31) (47.56) (11.41)
dcf_t_1 0.031 0.006 0.098 0.046 0.027 0.022 0.000 0.027
(0.580) (0.201) (0.795) (1.209) (0.751) (0.410) (0.0114) (0.283)
dna_t 0.266*** 0.139*** 0.665*** 0.067*** 0.267*** 0.303*** 0.097*** 0.574***
(6.556) (7.532) (6.781) (2.893) (11.24) (7.318) (5.292) (7.455)
dna_t_1 0.021 0.005 0.039 0.003 0.020* 0.014 0.002 0.050
(1.235) (0.638) (0.708) (0.443) (1.711) (0.789) (0.390) (1.259)
Capex 0.990*** 1.187*** 1.014*** 1.033*** 1.080*** 1.023*** 0.911*** 0.714***
(7.396) (16.49) (4.064) (9.589) (12.42) (7.666) (12.97) (3.027)
capex_t 0.052 0.027 0.041 0.096 0.090 0.002 0.126* 0.032
(0.380) (0.396) (0.158) (1.017) (1.136) (0.0132) (1.860) (0.138)
capex_t_1 0.030 0.018 0.080 0.015 0.107 0.027 0.079* 0.095
(0.319) (0.371) (0.427) (0.252) (1.609) (0.284) (1.879) (0.541)
Gl 0.843** 0.074 2.515*** 0.128 0.230 1.204*** 0.123 2.681***
(2.578) (0.493) (3.064) (0.778) (1.015) (3.506) (0.934) (3.580)
dgl_t 0.185 0.170 0.351 0.010 0.401 0.099 0.134 0.078
(0.466) (0.968) (0.385) (0.0545) (1.468) (0.245) (0.895) (0.0876)
dgl_t_1 0.372 0.107 1.079 0.022 0.440** 0.651** 0.100 1.318**
(1.279) (0.739) (1.636) (0.143) (2.032) (2.199) (0.892) (2.082)
































































Overinvestment Underinvestment Whole sample Overinvestment Underinvestment
dv_t_1 0.004 0.004* 0.010 0.001 0.006* 0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.918) (1.729) (1.039) (0.331) (1.802) (0.846) (1.073) (0.235)
Rate 0.043 0.109 0.073 0.320** 0.002 0.022 0.340*** 0.151
(0.177) (0.902) (0.156) (2.212) (0.0134) (0.0908) (3.410) (0.329)
Constant 0.078 0.158*** 0.050 0.107** 0.246*** 0.079 0.093*** 0.131
(0.930) (3.828) (0.318) (2.330) (4.303) (0.948) (2.823) (0.783)
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 1974 987 987 491 496 1974 1008 966
R-squared 0.400 0.853 0.304 0.807 0.764 0.408 0.764 0.190
Note: The dependent regression variable in this table is overinvest. Regression (1) is for the entire sample of CSOEs and LSOEs; regression (2) is for the entire sample of CSOEs;
regression (3) is for the entire sample of LSOEs; regression (4) is for the overinvestment sample of CSOEs (overinvest greater than zero); regression (5) is for the underinvestment
sample of CSOEs (overinvest less than zero); regression (6) is for the entire sample of CSOEs and LSOEs; regression (7) is for the overinvestment sample of CSOEs and LSOEs; and
regression (8) is for the underinvestment sample of CSOEs and LSOEs, with t-statistics in brackets.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.













































Panel B: Falsiﬁcation test for the eﬀect of the cash holdings of CSOEs and LSOEs on investment before and after performance evaluation.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment O nvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment
Cash 0.187*** 0.035 0.176*** 0.020 0.216*** 0.042 0.199*** 0.034 0.160*** 0.006 0.200*** 0.032
(5.929) (0.204) (5.541) (0.116) (6.855) (0.241) (6.190) (0.178) (5.068) (0.0348) (6.243) (0.198)
y2006 0.001 0.098
(0.0786) (1.205)
Central 0.008 0.141*** 0.012 0.153*** 0.003 0.142*** 0.008 0.150*** 0.010 0.140*** 0.008 0.117***
(0.823) (3.263) (1.283) (3.488) (0.336) (3.251) (0.899) (3.371) (1.154) (3.104) (0.866) (2.804)
y2006_cash 0.025 0.210
(0.302) (0.469)
central_cash 0.015 0.206 0.010 0.186 0.008 0.169 0.026 0.229 0.083** 0.191 0.028 0.300


























































































Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment
Cf 1.877*** 2.359*** 1.892*** 2.365*** 1.885*** 2.357*** 1.882*** 2.366*** 1.917*** 2.369*** 1.905*** 2.415***
(37.48) (9.389) (38.39) (9.390) (37.76) (9.367) (37.71) (9.384) (38.79) (9.335) (38.26) (9.661)
dcf_t 2.031*** 2.403*** 2.037*** 2.394*** 2.035*** 2.407*** 2.033*** 2.391*** 2.063*** 2.399*** 2.051*** 2.422***
(47.30) (11.37) (48.12) (11.31) (47.42) (11.32) (47.27) (11.27) (48.57) (11.21) (48.01) (11.53)
dcf_t_1 0.006 0.053 0.008 0.065 0.000 0.057 0.003 0.056 0.008 0.064 0.005 0.028
(0.264) (0.557) (0.365) (0.689) (0.0209) (0.599) (0.123) (0.585) (0.366) (0.670) (0.233) (0.303)
dna_t 0.087*** 0.582*** 0.101*** 0.586*** 0.091*** 0.569*** 0.087*** 0.567*** 0.101*** 0.570*** 0.093*** 0.563***
(4.663) (7.539) (5.411) (7.588) (4.858) (7.414) (4.655) (7.320) (5.551) (7.414) (5.086) (7.365)
dna_t_1 0.003 0.043 0.005 0.052 0.004 0.046 0.004 0.049 0.001 0.048 0.003 0.052
(0.534) (1.079) (0.809) (1.302) (0.625) (1.154) (0.644) (1.245) (0.240) (1.199) (0.565) (1.322)
Capex 0.894*** 0.694*** 0.900*** 0.690*** 0.906*** 0.708*** 0.899*** 0.707*** 0.921*** 0.711*** 0.896*** 0.753***
(12.60) (2.923) (12.87) (2.897) (12.78) (2.986) (12.66) (2.971) (13.31) (2.997) (12.73) (3.208)
capex_t 0.114* 0.007 0.118* 0.018 0.119* 0.002 0.126* 0.014 0.128* 0.012 0.114* 0.037
(1.655) (0.0311) (1.730) (0.0800) (1.729) (0.00673) (1.820) (0.0592) (1.908) (0.0532) (1.677) (0.162)
capex_t_1 0.079* 0.082 0.076* 0.067 0.079* 0.103 0.079* 0.096 0.077* 0.084 0.086** 0.056
(1.876) (0.465) (1.822) (0.378) (1.870) (0.582) (1.858) (0.545) (1.854) (0.474) (2.043) (0.323)
Gl 0.140 2.734*** 0.115 2.661*** 0.111 2.624*** 0.106 2.569*** 0.105 2.580*** 0.133 2.695***
(1.059) (3.639) (0.891) (3.569) (0.846) (3.519) (0.804) (3.432) (0.812) (3.448) (1.019) (3.649)
dgl_t 0.087 0.072 0.103 0.257 0.110 0.235 0.152 0.276 0.104 0.205 0.015 0.032
(0.576) (0.0809) (0.694) (0.290) (0.733) (0.263) (0.971) (0.301) (0.710) (0.230) (0.102) (0.0363)
dgl_t_1 0.098 1.074* 0.135 1.027 0.129 1.180* 0.085 1.148* 0.095 1.063* 0.093 1.354**
(0.866) (1.712) (1.209) (1.623) (1.123) (1.835) (0.755) (1.816) (0.869) (1.687) (0.835) (2.165)
dv_t_1 0.001 0.005 0.003* 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.002
(0.334) (0.471) (1.655) (1.146) (0.235) (0.112) (0.0944) (0.456) (1.014) (0.635) (0.0967) (0.216)
Rate 0.258** 1.127** 0.200*** 0.435 0.190*** 0.484 0.191*** 0.491* 0.312*** 0.510 0.012 0.196
(2.344) (2.271) (3.131) (1.459) (2.963) (1.641) (2.982) (1.666) (4.646) (1.566) (0.146) (0.551)
Constant 0.074** 0.004 0.071** 0.136 0.068** 0.129 0.072** 0.124 0.081*** 0.129 0.041 0.142
(2.164) (0.0214) (2.268) (0.833) (2.175) (0.789) (2.277) (0.754) (2.647) (0.779) (1.293) (0.868)
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 1008 966 1008 966 1008 966 1008 966 1008 966 1008 966
R-squared 0.759 0.184 0.765 0.185 0.760 0.184 0.758 0.183 0.770 0.182 0.763 0.202
Note: The dependent variable of this table is the value of the company V. Regressions (1), (3), (5), (7), (9) and (11) are for the overinvestment sub-sample and regressions (2), (4), (6),
(8), (10) and (12) are for the underinvestment sub-sample, with t-statistics in brackets.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.













































Panel A: OLS multiple regression for EVA policy implementation, cash holdings and corporate value.





CSOEs LSOEs CSOEs and
LSOEs
Cash 1.118*** 1.262** 1.072*** 0.476 0.167
(3.021) (2.439) (2.773) (1.283) (0.438)












cf 2.410*** 5.064*** 3.386*** 1.730*** 2.283***
(3.343) (4.797) (5.084) (2.806) (5.165)
dcf_t 1.008** 0.955 0.906* 0.682 1.290***
(2.018) (1.303) (1.958) (1.388) (3.696)
dcf_t_1 0.618* 4.226*** 1.187*** 0.626* 0.115
(1.740) (6.366) (3.410) (1.734) (0.513)
dna_t 0.093 0.125 0.061 0.337 0.145
(0.420) (0.247) (0.275) (1.227) (0.839)
dna_t_1 0.055 2.117*** 0.456*** 1.064*** 0.116
(0.626) (11.44) (5.189) (6.571) (1.574)
capex 1.824** 3.786** 2.459*** 3.970*** 3.031***
(1.994) (2.564) (2.819) (5.431) (5.344)
capex_t 1.304 2.236 1.506* 2.859*** 2.165***
(1.545) (1.373) (1.805) (3.809) (3.716)
capex_t_1 0.464 1.898 0.253 0.315 0.008
(0.780) (1.494) (0.424) (0.588) (0.0208)
gl 0.876 3.625 0.323 0.882 0.752
(0.473) (1.106) (0.182) (0.374) (0.525)
dgl_t 2.630 0.248 3.601* 0.059 2.826*
(1.307) (0.0543) (1.769) (0.0226) (1.722)
dgl_t_1 4.363** 1.308 0.919 5.650*** 1.030
(2.469) (0.351) (0.525) (2.954) (0.829)
dv_t_1 0.100*** 1.450*** 0.250*** 0.261*** 0.021
(3.690) (16.34) (8.930) (9.310) (1.029)
Rate 6.390*** 2.340 2.442* 2.270 4.241***
(4.547) (0.544) (1.675) (1.642) (4.134)
Constant 0.303 0.802 0.819 2.192*** 1.325***
(0.589) (0.667) (1.613) (4.690) (3.690)
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 661 326 987 987 1974
R-squared 0.178 0.654 0.239 0.194 0.124
Note: The dependent variable of this table is the value of the company V. Regression (1) is for the CSOE observations before policy
implementation; regression (2) is for the CSOE observations after policy implementation; regression (3) is for the CSOE sub-sample;
regression (4) is for the LSOE sub-sample; and regression (5) is for both the CSOE and LSOE observations, with t-statistics in brackets.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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increases signiﬁcantly after the policy implementation. The inﬂuencing factor of cash on CSOE value is
between 1.317 and 0.566 after the policy implementation.
Table 8b
Panel B: Falsiﬁcation test for the value of cash holdings.
Variables Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4) Regression (5) Regression (6)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cash 0.041 0.449 0.046 0.005 0.339 0.093
(0.124) (1.347) (0.138) (0.0156) (0.984) (0.280)
y2006 0.788***
(4.246)
Central 0.290*** 0.145 0.333*** 0.272*** 0.247*** 0.306***
(3.181) (1.564) (3.665) (2.912) (2.652) (3.406)
y2006_cash 0.762
(0.864)
central_cash 1.326*** 0.721 1.340*** 1.188** 0.601 1.069**













































Cf 2.332*** 2.169*** 2.111*** 2.316*** 2.111*** 2.127***
(5.327) (4.991) (4.878) (5.268) (4.802) (4.884)
(continued on next page)
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Table 8b (continued)
Variables Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4) Regression (5) Regression (6)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
dcf_t 1.349*** 1.059*** 1.021*** 1.418*** 1.084*** 1.187***
(3.915) (3.096) (2.993) (4.081) (3.127) (3.465)
dcf_t_1 0.165 0.020 0.065 0.138 0.001 0.137
(0.742) (0.0923) (0.295) (0.616) (0.00329) (0.617)
dna_t 0.130 0.004 0.063 0.125 0.153 0.085
(0.756) (0.0226) (0.370) (0.725) (0.894) (0.499)
dna_t_1 0.111 0.143** 0.180** 0.142* 0.123* 0.118
(1.517) (1.983) (2.479) (1.947) (1.677) (1.632)
capex 3.052*** 2.727*** 2.911*** 3.130*** 3.023*** 3.190***
(5.427) (4.883) (5.243) (5.537) (5.363) (5.699)
capex_t 2.067*** 1.994*** 2.460*** 2.403*** 2.267*** 2.365***
(3.585) (3.478) (4.312) (4.130) (3.920) (4.112)
capex_t_1 0.062 0.122 0.041 0.060 0.012 0.045
(0.158) (0.314) (0.106) (0.152) (0.0295) (0.115)
gl 0.374 0.377 2.033 0.484 1.496 0.504
(0.265) (0.270) (1.460) (0.342) (1.058) (0.360)
dgl_t 1.398 3.175** 1.881 0.871 2.814* 1.070
(0.856) (1.975) (1.173) (0.520) (1.732) (0.658)
dgl_t_1 0.882 0.397 0.655 1.365 1.114 0.972
(0.720) (0.325) (0.532) (1.106) (0.907) (0.797)
dv_t_1 0.031 0.057*** 0.045** 0.041** 0.026 0.036*
(1.527) (2.772) (2.237) (2.131) (1.311) (1.874)
Rate 2.243** 4.483*** 3.479*** 3.661*** 2.171*** 7.610***
(2.043) (6.843) (5.386) (5.574) (3.068) (9.355)
Constant 2.323*** 0.997*** 1.472*** 1.254*** 1.442*** 0.817**
(6.197) (2.922) (4.355) (3.651) (4.190) (2.358)
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 1974 1974 1974 1974 1974 1974
R-squared 0.140 0.154 0.160 0.131 0.134 0.149
Note: The dependent variable of this table is the value of the company V. t-statistics are in brackets.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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tions. The regression coeﬃcient of imp * central * cash is 2.636 in regression (3) and signiﬁcant at the 0.05 lev-
el. Among the overinvestment observations, the value of CSOE cash holdings signiﬁcantly increases after the
policy implementation compared with that of the LSOEs’ cash holdings. However, in regression (4), which
focuses on overinvestment observations, the regression coeﬃcient of the interaction term is insigniﬁcant.
The regression results in Table 9 show that the increase in the value of the cash holdings may be attributed
to the improved underinvestment of CSOEs. However, in the full sample, it may be attributed to CSOEs’ over-
investment inhibition compared with LSOEs.
6.4. Eﬀect of accounting performance on the value of the cash holdings
After the implementation of the EVA performance evaluation, company managers improved their enter-
prises’ investment structures out of personal interest and invested money in proﬁtable projects. Does a com-
pany’s accounting performance aﬀect its investment performance and thereby the value of its cash holdings?
The rate of net proﬁt to equity (ROE), an accounting indicator, has relatively close links with the cost of
equity capital. We divide the sample according to the annual industry median. We deﬁne a company as high
performance if its ROE exceeds the annual industry median; otherwise, we deﬁne it as low performance.
Table 10 shows the sub-sample regression results.
Table 9
Overinvestment and the value of corporate cash holdings.
Variables Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4)
Overinvestment of CSOEs Underinvestment of CSOEs Overinvestment Underinvestment
Cash 1.814*** 0.566 0.604 0.258
(3.345) (0.974) (1.128) (0.460)
Imp 0.183 0.079 0.113 0.466**
(0.770) (0.488) (0.556) (2.368)
Central 0.294* 0.194
(1.951) (1.333)
imp_cash 0.951 1.317* 1.039 0.696







cf 5.656*** 0.347 3.184*** 0.523
(4.855) (0.367) (4.413) (0.681)
dcf_t 1.480* 0.248 1.646*** 0.611
(1.651) (0.340) (2.616) (0.943)
dcf_t_1 2.273*** 0.000 0.107 0.211
(3.852) (0.00114) (0.311) (0.720)
dna_t 0.669* 0.413 0.582** 0.134
(1.790) (1.557) (2.225) (0.567)
dna_t_1 0.475*** 0.537*** 0.090 0.216*
(3.947) (4.116) (0.956) (1.775)
Capex 5.523*** 1.273 3.331*** 2.613***
(3.319) (1.313) (3.275) (3.608)
capex_t 2.103 1.757** 2.517** 1.906***
(1.366) (1.984) (2.517) (2.712)
capex_t_1 0.096 0.042 0.456 0.531
(0.101) (0.0570) (0.767) (0.989)
gl 3.712 9.306*** 4.886** 6.398***
(1.422) (3.678) (2.536) (2.783)
dgl_t 4.663* 0.088 4.435** 0.400
(1.669) (0.0289) (2.094) (0.147)
dgl_t_1 1.336 4.460* 2.272 2.045
(0.528) (1.849) (1.378) (1.053)
dv_t_1 0.324*** 0.202*** 0.084*** 0.055*
(7.436) (5.918) (3.022) (1.882)
Rate 3.393 1.478 5.530*** 3.579**
(1.445) (0.866) (3.677) (2.539)
Constant 0.211 1.532** 0.902* 1.455***
(0.275) (2.407) (1.782) (2.825)
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 491 496 1008 966
R-squared 0.310 0.237 0.178 0.115
Note: The dependent variable of this table is the value of the company V. Regression (1) is for the overinvestment sub-sample of CSOEs;
regression (2) is for the underinvestment sub-sample of CSOEs; regression (3) is for the overinvestment sub-samples of both CSOEs and
LSOEs; and regression (4) is for the underinvestment sub-samples of both CSOEs and LSOEs, with t-statistics in brackets.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
236 Y. Shen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 213–241Regression (1) in Table 10 shows that the regression coeﬃcients of cash and imp * cash are 1.239 and 1.715,
respectively, and are both signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. Among the CSOEs with high accounting performance,
cash holdings have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on CSOEs’ value before and after the implementation of the
Table 10
Value of cash holdings according to accounting performance.









Cash 1.239** 0.431 0.097 0.165
(2.131) (0.859) (0.176) (0.309)
Imp 0.275 0.105 0.034 0.503***
(1.218) (0.647) (0.174) (2.664)
Central 0.579*** 0.093
(3.828) (0.655)
imp_cash 1.715** 0.179 0.959 1.045







cf 4.989*** 0.711 3.729*** 0.147
(4.695) (0.833) (5.880) (0.226)
dcf_t 1.429* 0.220 2.129*** 0.393
(1.793) (0.436) (4.021) (0.850)
dcf_t_1 1.846*** 0.203 0.343 0.435
(3.617) (0.449) (1.145) (1.310)
dna_t 0.862** 0.781*** 0.573** 0.411*
(2.251) (3.043) (2.174) (1.702)
dna_t_1 1.325*** 0.306*** 0.864*** 0.106
(6.833) (3.457) (6.012) (1.206)
Capex 5.554*** 0.472 4.035*** 2.297***
(3.564) (0.497) (4.550) (3.107)
capex_t 3.019* 0.724 2.996*** 1.467**
(1.948) (0.832) (3.187) (1.996)
capex_t_1 1.796* 0.856 1.011* 0.091
(1.779) (1.272) (1.680) (0.173)
gl 2.574 7.888*** 5.587*** 8.560***
(0.946) (3.602) (2.883) (3.894)
dgl_t 2.798 2.763 4.629** 0.938
(0.797) (1.235) (1.982) (0.411)
dgl_t_1 0.794 1.229 0.559 0.871
(0.280) (0.618) (0.340) (0.466)
dv_t_1 0.232*** 0.296*** 0.031 0.013
(5.599) (8.583) (1.131) (0.464)
Rate 3.367 3.192* 3.402** 6.104***
(1.454) (1.899) (2.381) (4.231)
Constant 1.480* 0.376 1.365*** 1.533***
(1.711) (0.674) (2.760) (3.013)
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 485 502 978 996
R-squared 0.319 0.310 0.216 0.126
Note: The dependent variable of this table is the value of the company V. High and low performances are divided according to the annual
industry median. High performance is determined when a company’s ROE exceeds the annual industry median, otherwise, low perfor-
mance is determined. Regression (1) is for high-performance CSOEs; regression (2) is for low-performance CSOEs; regression (3) is for
high-performance CSOEs and LSOEs; and regression (4) is for low-performance CSOEs and LSOEs, with t-statistics in brackets.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
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Table 11
Comparison of the value of cash holdings in enterprises that create value and suﬀer value loss.
Variables EVA > 0 EVA < 0
Before implementation After implementation Before and after
implementation
Before implementation After implementation Before and after
implementation
Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4) Regression (5) Regression (6)
Cash 1.283*** 1.653** 1.102** 0.130 0.063 0.140





cf 3.630*** 7.375*** 5.672*** 0.021 0.133 0.125
(3.526) (4.926) (6.173) (0.0184) (0.0752) (0.123)
dcf_t 1.454* 1.153 1.512** 0.156 0.359 0.043
(1.858) (1.133) (2.228) (0.245) (0.302) (0.0716)
dcf_t_1 0.690 5.716*** 1.809*** 0.568 0.943 0.454
(1.455) (6.288) (3.972) (0.991) (1.010) (0.876)
dna_t 0.238 1.039 0.555* 0.474 1.205 0.549*
(0.699) (1.480) (1.649) (1.551) (1.537) (1.865)
dna_t_1 0.461* 2.226*** 1.327*** 0.165* 1.120** 0.308***
(1.844) (10.22) (7.556) (1.683) (2.172) (3.165)
capex 4.024*** 3.112 5.116*** 0.964 2.879 1.413
(2.875) (1.280) (3.884) (0.776) (1.536) (1.319)
capex_t 2.465* 2.143 2.816** 0.162 1.478 0.606
(1.898) (0.909) (2.259) (0.152) (0.680) (0.599)
capex_t_1 0.499 1.215 1.277 0.967 1.470 1.156
(0.544) (0.703) (1.484) (1.222) (0.785) (1.523)
gl 6.299** 3.399 3.410 7.978*** 6.603 8.497***
(2.366) (0.767) (1.391) (2.981) (1.342) (3.450)
dgl_t 2.828 2.855 2.785 2.352 0.609 4.069
(0.922) (0.476) (0.938) (0.864) (0.0820) (1.547)
dgl_t_1 10.771*** 4.625 5.101** 2.842 1.869 3.977*
(4.044) (0.945) (2.025) (1.224) (0.309) (1.777)
dv_t_1 0.106*** 1.431*** 0.271*** 0.125*** 1.447*** 0.237***
(2.875) (12.00) (7.318) (3.072) (10.82) (5.955)
Rate 6.417*** 6.073 2.098 7.487*** 2.687 4.620**
(2.978) (1.021) (0.967) (4.048) (0.445) (2.554)
Constant 0.224 0.236 2.215** 0.165 1.951 0.678
(0.214) (0.159) (2.038) (0.300) (1.325) (1.216)
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 368 203 571 293 123 416
R-squared 0.234 0.685 0.328 0.226 0.704 0.281
Note: Regressions (1), (2) and (3) are for the EVA > 0 sub-sample and regressions (4), (5) and (6) are for the EVA < 0 sub-sample, with t-statistics in brackets.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
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niﬁcantly. Among the CSOEs with low accounting performance, the value of cash holdings is negative and
does not improve after the implementation of the EVA performance evaluation.
We ﬁnd similar results for LSOEs. In the high-performance companies, the value of CSOE cash holdings
increases signiﬁcantly after the implementation of the EVA policy compared with that of LSOE cash holdings.
The results of regressions (3) and (4) provide evidence of this. We divide the companies into high- and low-
performance groups according to the 5.5% rate of equity capital cost, which is regulated by the SASAC,
and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant results regardless of performance group.
We also analyze the value of CSOE cash holdings under diﬀerent EVA levels. Table 11 shows the results.
According to Table 11, cash holdings have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on company value in the value cre-
ation sub-sample from regressions (1)–(3). However, the positive eﬀect of cash holdings on company value
does not pass the signiﬁcance test in the value loss sub-sample from regressions (4)–(6). Furthermore, we
examine the changes in cash holding value before and after the policy implementation. Looking at the value
creation sub-sample from regressions (1)–(3), the regression coeﬃcient of cash in regression (2) is greater than
that in regression (1). However, the regression coeﬃcient of the interaction term imp_cash is insigniﬁcant. The
case is the same in the value loss sub-sample.
The regression results in Table 11 show that value creation is an important factor aﬀecting cash value.
However, the EVA policy implementation does not signiﬁcantly change the cash holdings value of enterprises
that create value.
7. Conclusions and limitations
7.1. Conclusions
CSOEs account for a signiﬁcant proportion of the Chinese economy. Motivating heads of CSOEs to work
hard and protecting the state-owned assets and interests of shareholders are important economic targets of
state regulators. As a performance supervisor, the SASAC is focused on evaluation and value creation, and
assesses the heads of CSOEs to these ends. However, accounting performance may not be a perfect indicator
of how CSOEs can fundamentally improve the philosophies and eﬃciency of their businesses. In addition,
CSOEs are often large because their monopolies lead them to hold large amounts of cash, whether intention-
ally or unintentionally. Facing serious agency problems, an enterprise may abuse its cash or store large
amounts of cash needlessly, resulting in a decline in corporate investment eﬃciency and ultimately leading
to a fall in the value of its cash holdings. The SASAC must determine how to motivate executives to work
hard, improve the investment eﬃciency of enterprises and enhance the value of their cash holdings. In
2010, it decided to fully implement EVA performance evaluations of CSOEs in an eﬀort to improve business
eﬃciency.
This study considers the background and transition of China’s economic system. In 2010, the SASAC
implemented an EVA performance evaluation policy to raise the value of cash holdings in CSOEs and protect
shareholder equity. We adopt a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method and conduct comparison tests to determine the
changes in the value of cash holdings between CSOEs and LSOEs before and after the policy execution from
2006 to 2011. The investment structure of CSOEs improved after the 2010 implementation of the EVA per-
formance evaluation, resulting in signiﬁcant increases in the value of their cash holdings. The ﬁndings of
our falsiﬁcation test and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method are consistent.
This paper makes the following contributions. First, it empirically tests the EVA performance evaluation
policy implemented by the SASAC in 2010 to determine whether it improved business eﬃciency and the value
of cash holdings in practice. This provides empirical evidence for EVA performance evaluation policy and its
wider applications. Second, it enriches and develops the literature related to the value of cash holdings. It con-
siders whether EVA performance evaluation can increase that value in transition economies such as China and
enriches the economic consequences of EVA research areas. Third, it enriches the theoretical research lit-
erature related to investor protection and the mitigation of agency costs in transition economies and emerging
markets.
240 Y. Shen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 213–2417.2. Limitations
This paper considers the EVA performance evaluation policy implemented by the SASAC in 2010 for
CSOEs to be an exogenous event. Although it is undeniable that some companies (including CSOEs and
LSOEs) voluntarily implemented the EVA performance evaluation before 2010, it is impossible to determine
the years in which these implementations occurred. This may aﬀect our conclusions to some extent. In addi-
tion, we do not investigate the EVA performance evaluations of CSOE subsidiaries in our sample, as it is dif-
ﬁcult to obtain this information, which may also aﬀect our conclusions.
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